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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Nicholas David Johnson appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdict finding him guilty of second-degree murder. Johnson contends the district
court committed evidentiary error and abused its sentencing discretion.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Jarmey Mccane was at Bill and Stacy Kron's house along with his sister
and brother-in-law, Stacy and Raymond Lopez. (Trial Tr., p.281, Ls.9-16, p.573,
Ls.3-19.) That's where Jarmey first met Johnson and where Johnson murdered
Jarmey.
When Jarmey first arrived at the Krons, Bill introduced him to Johnson as
a "good dude," to which Johnson responded, "nah." (Trial Tr., p.282, Ls.13-24.)
Off and on through the evening, Johnson continued to say things to Jarmey, and
Jarmey would just try to "blow it off' by saying, "[w]hatever, dude." (Trial Tr.,
p.285, Ls.12-15.) Johnson continued to engage in this behavior despite being
asked to stop and "show some respect."

(Trial Tr., p.285, L.19 - p.287, L.1;

p.448, L.15 - p.450, L.6; p.469, Ls.1-8; p.470, Ls.4-7.) At one point, Bill decided
he was "done with the situation," so he went to his room "grabbed a bat," and
"told everybody the party ... was over." (Trial Tr., p.472, Ls.7-11.) Stacy took
the bat from Bill, put it in the garage, and everyone went outside and was
standing in the street in front of the house, except Johnson who stayed on the
front porch.

(Trial Tr., p.473, Ls.2-8; p.505, L.15 - p.506, L.14; p.581, L.7 -

p.583, L.23.)
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While Bill was in the street apologizing to his friends, Johnson went back
inside and took a large kitchen knife with an eight-inch long blade, which he
concealed in his pocket. (Trial Tr., p.474, L.24 - p.476, L.6; p.615, L.4 - p.617,
L.6; Exhibit 28.) Johnson returned to the porch and yelled something in a "cocky"
tone to which Jarmey responded, "What?" and started walking toward Johnson.
(Trial Tr., p.295, Ls.2-15; p.297, Ls.1-4; p.507, L.17 - p.508, L.13.) As soon as
Jarmey reached Johnson, Johnson stabbed him.

(Trial Tr., p.508, Ls.22-24.)

Jarmey grabbed his neck and said, "I think I just got stabbed." (Trial Tr., p.511,
Ls.11-23; p.590, Ls.10-14.) Jarmey collapsed in the front yard and died while
Johnson fled in his truck.

(Trial Tr., p.593, L.16 - p.594, L.1, p.513, Ls.3-4;

p.595, Ls.1-14; Exhibit 2.) Raymond pursued Johnson on foot, punching out his
driver's side window, but Johnson kicked Raymond in the stomach and got away.
(Trial Tr., p.514, L.10 - p.515, L.3; p.625, Ls.3-11; Exhibit 19.)
Johnson fled to his girlfriend's house and changed his bloody shirt and,
approximately 20 minutes later, he called 911 to report the stabbing. 1 (Trial Tr.,
p.625, L.20 - p.626, L.15.) When Johnson called 911, he calmly reported he just
stabbed someone, claiming "two people came at [him] and tried to jump [him)" so
he "grabbed a knife and stuck one." (Trial Tr., p.188, Ls.18-24; Exhibit 1.) When
asked for his name, Johnson identified himself as "George Hernandez," and
when asked where he was, Johnson hung up. (Exhibit 1.) When the dispatcher
called back the first time, Johnson did not answer and the dispatcher got
Johnson's voicemail, which said, "Hey this is Nick."

1

(Trial Tr., p.188, L.25 -

Raymond had already called 911 by that time. (Trial Tr., p.517, Ls.19-22.)
2

p.189, L.2; Exhibit 1.)

The second time the dispatcher called Johnson, he

answered and she asked, "Is this George?" (Exhibit 1.) Johnson calmly said,
"Yes" and he repeated his story that he "stuck" a guy when two guys tried to
"jump" him. (Exhibit 1.) Johnson also denied knowing the victim, said he was
not "sure" whether the homeowner knew the victim, and said he was not
"planning on going to jail."

(Exhibit 1.) When the dispatcher asked whether

Johnson was planning on harming himself, he said "hold on" and hung up.
(Exhibit 1; Trial Tr., p.189, Ls.6-11.)
Law enforcement eventually located Johnson in his truck and initiated a
traffic stop. (Trial Tr., p.312, L.4 - p.317, L.17.) Johnson's driver's side window
was shattered, there was blood spatter in his truck and the bloody murder
weapon was on the front seat mostly covered by a piece of paper. (Trial Tr.,
p.321, L.13 - p.322, L.1; Exhibits 24-29.) Johnson was taken into custody at
which time it was noted he had no visible injuries and he declined an offer to be
examined by paramedics. (Trial Tr., p.341, L.9 - p.342, L.6; p.346, L.10 - p.348,
L.1 0; Exhibit 49.) When interviewed, Johnson again claimed he was attacked by
two guys and he had the knife because he felt "threatened." (Exhibit 49.)
The state charged Johnson with second-degree murder.

(R., pp.10-11,

23-24.) Prior to trial, the state filed a motion in limine seeking the admission of
"certain photographs taken concerning the crime scene, victim, and autopsy."
(R., pp.29-31.) Johnson objected to four of the photographs. 2 (10/25/2011 Tr.,
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At the hearing on the state's motion in limine, Johnson stated he objected to
"numbers 2, 13, 14, and 15," however, it appears based on the description of
those photographs provided at the pre-trial hearing that those numbers are
3

p.6, Ls.18-19.) The court ruled that one of the four was admissible and it would
reserve ruling on the admissibility of the other three to see "how the facts of the
casearegoingtotiein." (10/25/2011 Tr., p.15, L.21-p.16, L.14.)
During trial, the court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury at
which Dr. Robert Deters, the forensic pathologist who performed Jarmey's
autopsy, testified regarding the relevance of five photographs - Exhibits 36, 37,
38, 39, and 40. (Trial Tr., p.381, L.8 - p.390, L.14.) Johnson again objected,
arguing the photographs had "significant prejudicial value" and had no "probative
value, in light of the fact that [the defense was] willing to stipulate to" "whatever
facts the[] [state] want[ed] to put in the record about [Jarmey's] autopsy." (Trial
Tr., p.391, L.4 - p.392, L.13; see also p.398, L.24 - p.399, L.6.)

The court

sustained Johnson's objection to Exhibit 36, but allowed the admission of
Exhibits 37, 38, 39, and 40. (Trial Tr., p.407, Ls.10-11.)
The jury found Johnson guilty of second-degree murder. (R., pp.138-139.)
The court imposed a unified life sentence with 15 years fixed. (R., pp.147-148.)
Johnson filed a Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied. (R., pp.167-170;
Order Denying Rule 35 Motion (augmentation).) Johnson filed a timely notice of
appeal from the judgment. (R., pp.147, 149-153.)

different than the exhibits numbers assigned to the same photographs at trial.
(Compare 10/25/2011 Tr., p.6, L.18 - p.7, L.19, p.10, L.18 - p.13, L.4 with
Exhibits 2, 13, 14, and 15.)
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ISSUES
Johnson states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the district court err when, over his Idaho Rule of Evidence
403 objection, it admitted four autopsy photographs without
conducting the balancing test required under Rule 403?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a
unified life sentence, with fifteen years fixed, following Mr.
Johnson's conviction for murder in the second degree?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when, in light of the
new information provided, it denied Mr. Johnson's Rule 35
motion?
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1. Has Johnson failed to cite any authority for the proposition that a district court
must conduct its balancing under I.RE. 403 on the record and does the record
disprove Johnson's claim that the district court did not conduct such an analysis
in this case?
2. Has Johnson failed to show the district court abused its discretion in imposing a
unified life sentence with 15 years fixed upon the jury verdict finding Johnson
guilty of murdering Jarmey Mccane?
3. Has Johnson failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by denying
his Rule 35 motion?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
Johnson Has Failed To Establish Error In The Admission Of Four Autopsy
Photographs
A.

Introduction
Johnson argues the district court erred in admitting the four photographs

from Jarmey's autopsy, which were designated Exhibits 37, 38, 39, and 40.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-10.) Johnson does not challenge the relevance of the
photographs but instead argues the court "never balanced the relevance of the
exhibits against the potential for substantial prejudice as required under Rule
403." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Johnson's argument fails for two reasons. First,
Johnson fails to cite any authority that requires a district court to detail its 403
analysis on the record. Second, the record disproves Johnson's claim that the
court did not engage in such an analysis. Johnson has, therefore, failed to show
error in the admission of Exhibits 37, 38, 39, and 40.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while

the decision to admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion."
State v. Shutz, 143 Idaho 200, 202, 141 P.3d 1069, 1071 (2006) (citing State v.
Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 632, 945 P.2d 1, 3 (1997)). When the appellate court
reviews an evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion, it conducts "a multi-tiered
inquiry, examining 1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one
of discretion, 2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific
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choices, and 3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason."
State v. Hoak, 147 Idaho 919, 921, 216 P.3d 1291, 1293 (Ct. App. 2009) (citation
omitted).

"[W)hen reviewing the determination that the probative value of the

evidence is not outweighed by unfair prejudice," the Court "use[s] an abuse of
discretion standard." State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 393, 924 P.2d 1230, 1237
(Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted).

C.

Johnson Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of Exhibits 37, 38,
39, And 40
Exhibits 37 through 40 depict the stab wound Johnson inflicted on Jarmey

including the path and depth of the wound, which measured seven to eight
inches. (Trial Tr., p.428, L.16 - p.429, L.11; Exhibits 37-40.) The trajectory and
depth of the wound was relevant to "match the physical evidence, in this case the
body, with what actually happened at the scene." (Trial Tr., p.429, Ls.12-18.)
Under I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury. I.RE. 403. See State v. Guana, 117 Idaho 83, 88,
785 P.2d 647, 652 (Ct. App. 1989) ("All probative evidence is, to some extent,
prejudicial. The question is whether that prejudice is unfair-that is, whether it
harms the defendant not because of inferences which reasonably can be drawn
from the facts, but because it inflames the jury and rouses them to
'overmastering hostility."'). At the pre-trial hearing regarding the admissibility of
the autopsy photos, the court noted, "The nature and extent of what's admitted is
all balanced under what we call Rule 403." (10/25/2011 Tr., p.9, Ls.11-13.) The
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court also explained the need to "balance" the relevance of the photographs
against their "inflammatory nature." (10/25/2011 Tr., p.13, L.22 - p.15, L.13.)
At trial, when the court revisited the admissibility of the photographs
following Dr. Deters' testimony, it stated:
. . . I'm ready to make my rulings. Let me first of all apply the
standard. We're talking about, you know, the -- there's a -- this is
ultimately a discretionary call on the court. First of all, I looked at is
it relevant. Are there facts at issue in the case that these exhibits
and photographs will assist the jury in deciding. And then are they
outweighed by cumulative or prejudicial or inflammatory impact that
might inflame the passions of the jury.
There are a number of cases where this is addressed by the
Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals in the State of Idaho.
Most recently is State versus Reid, R-e-i-d. It's a 2011 case from
May. 151 Idaho 80 is the Idaho cite, 253 P.3d.
Also there's [sic] other cases that have come down. State v.
Hawkins, 2000 -- I mean State v. Hawkins is 131 Idaho 396. Page
402 addresses the standard which is -- and I'm quoting the Idaho
Supreme Court from the Hawkins case: It is well established that
where allegedly inflammatory evidence is relevant and material to
an issue of fact, the trial court must determine whether the
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.
It's the discretion of the trial court, and I'm going to quote this
court a little farther here, and then I'm going to address some other
-- another case: The court notes the fact that the photographs
depict the actual body of the victim and the wounds inflicted on the
victim and may tend to excite the emotions of the jury is not a basis
for excluding them.
(Trial Tr., p.400, L.4 - p.401, L.13.)
The court thereafter rejected Johnson's argument that the state should be
prohibited from "put[ting] on their dog and pony show for the jury" given his
willingness to "stipulate to whatever facts they want to put in the record about this
autopsy," and ruled that the state could admit Exhibits 37, 38, 39, and 40. (Trial
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Tr., p.391, Ls.18-22, p.405, L.3 - p.406, L.21.) The court, however, rejected the
admission of Exhibit 36, which was a picture of Jarvey's face "on the autopsy
table," noting that the picture was not necessary for purposes of identification and
although the picture was "not particularly graphic or gruesome," the court was
concerned about its "inflammatory nature."

(Trial Tr., p.398, Ls.14-15, p.406,

Ls.4-14.)
On appeal, Johnson does not challenge the relevance of Exhibits 37
through 40, nor could he. See, sLll, State v. Beason, 95 Idaho 267, 277-79, 506
P.2d 1340, 1350-53 (1973); State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 86-88, 253 P.3d 754,
760-62 (Ct. App. 2011 ).

Instead, Johnson claims the district court failed to

"conduct[ ] the requisite balancing test" in admitting the exhibits. (Appellant's
Brief, p.9.)

More specifically, Johnson contends that although the court

specifically addressed the inflammatory nature of Exhibit 36, "it failed to do so
with respect to the remaining four photographs." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) This,
Johnson argues, "amounts to error, and should result in [his] conviction being
vacated." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Johnson's argument is without merit.
First, Johnson fails to cite any authority for the proposition that a trial court
is required to conduct its prejudice analysis on the record.

While a court

undoubtedly must conduct the weighing required by I.RE. 403 before excluding
evidence, this does not mean a court errs in failing to explain its prejudice
analysis on the record. See State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720,
722 (2010). It is well-settled that this Court will uphold the implicit determinations
of the trial court if they are supported by the record and the applicable law. ~ .
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State v. Doe, 136 Idaho 427, 432, 34 P.3d 1110, 1115 (Ct. App. 2001 ); State v.
Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 788, 979 P.2d 659, 661 (Ct. App. 1999) (appellate
court will review "implicit" findings where trial court does not articulate findings on
record). Because this Court is capable of reviewing the trial court's admissibility
determination without knowing the specifics of the district court's thought
process, Johnson has failed to establish he is entitled to reversal on the basis
that the district court allegedly did not specifically articulate that the probative
value of Exhibits 37, 38, 39, and 40 was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.
Second, even assuming the record must reveal some indication that the
trial court conducted a 403 analysis, the record in this case clearly reflects as
much. Indeed, as Johnson acknowledges, his objection to the evidence was that
it was unfairly prejudicial. (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) The district court's comments
clearly indicate an understanding of the objection and analysis of the admissibility
of the photographs in light of their "inflammatory" nature, including citation to the
appropriate legal standard. (10/25/2011 Tr., p.13, L.22 - p.15, L.13, p.400, L.4 p.406, L.3.) The court even warned the jurors they would be shown "somewhat
graphic" and "[un]pleasant" pictures but admonished them not to allow the
"potential inflammatory nature" of the pictures to "cloud [their] judgment in
determining what happens." (Trial Tr., p.414, L.16 - p.415, L.17.) The court
obviously would not give such an instruction had it been unaware of and failed to
consider the prejudicial nature of the photographs in determining their
admissibility.
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That the district court did not employ the language Johnson apparently
thinks it should have in relation to each photograph admitted falls far short of
establishing the court failed to "balance[ ] the relevance of the exhibits against
the potential for substantial prejudice as required under Rule 403." (Appellant's
Brief, p.10.) Neither the law nor the record support Johnson's claim of error in
relation to the admission of Exhibits 37, 38, 39, and 40; therefore, Johnson's
claim fails.

11.
Johnson Has Failed To Establish His Sentence Is Excessive
A.

Introduction
Johnson asserts his sentence is excessive "in light of the mitigating

circumstances present in his case, including his sincere expression of remorse
and regret and his lack of any prior felony convictions." (Appellant's Brief, pp.1011.) Johnson has failed to establish an abuse of discretion given the nature of
the offense and the objectives of sentencing.

B.

Standard Of Review
A district court's sentence is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009).

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
In order to demonstrate an abuse of the district court's sentencing

discretion, Johnson must "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts,
the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment."
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State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives
are: "(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978).
Johnson cannot meet his burden in this case.
On appeal, Johnson relies on what he characterizes as "remorse and
regret" over Jarmey's murder.

(Appellant's Brief, p.10.)

While Johnson

undoubtedly apologized and said he was "sorry," he continued to refer to his
actions as a "mistake that [he] made that ended in absolute tragedy."
(Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Johnson's act of taking a knife, concealing it, and then
provoking Jarmey to approach him so he could stab him was hardly a "mistake."
There was no evidence, other than Johnson's incredible testimony, that Jarmey
ever touched Johnson and the jury rejected the theory that Johnson acted in selfdefense.

While Johnson may be sorry for his actions, he committed an

intentional, senseless act of violence that resulted in Jarmey McCane's death.
Johnson's violent actions on June 25, 2011, were also consistent with his
history.

A former girlfriend reported that Johnson abused her, "[w]as always

willing to fight," and "bragged he killed someone with a bat when he was
younger." (PSI, p.5.) Another individual reported that Johnson "struck [him] in
the head and rendered [him] unconscious" after he grabbed Johnson's throat
because Johnson would "not stop taunting him." (PSI, p.5.) In addition, Johnson
has a lengthy criminal history which includes juvenile adjudications for disturbing
the peace, possession/consumption of alcohol by a minor, petit theft, resisting or
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obstructing, and possession of tobacco, as well as misdemeanor convictions for
possession of a controlled substance, driving under the influence (two
convictions), resisting or obstructing (two convictions), providing false information
to an officer, willful concealment, and battery (amended from domestic violence).
(PSI, pp.8-15.) Johnson also has numerous prior driving-related offenses. (PSI,
pp.9-15.) Most notably, Johnson was pending sentencing for domestic battery in
the presence of a child and felony injury to a child when he murdered Jarmey.
(PSI, pp.15-16.)
Although Johnson also attempts to blame alcohol for his actions on June
25, it is worth noting that, at trial, he was reluctant to accept responsibility for his
alcohol use, appearing to blame his alcohol consumption on Bill Kron, claiming
Bill "insisted on it." (Trial Tr., p.608, Ls.7-10.) In addition, Johnson has had the
benefit of prior treatment, apparently to no avail. (PSI, p.21.) Indeed, the doctor
who verified Johnson's past treatment noted that although Johnson "made some
improvement," he "had a lot of anger." (PSI, p.21.)
Even considering the mitigating information in Johnson's case such as his
"turbulent childhood" and family support (Appellant's Brief, p.13), as noted by the
district court, the "facts of the case warrant the sentence" (Trial Tr., p.814, L.5).
Johnson has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that, under any
reasonable view of the facts, his sentence is excessive.
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111.
Johnson Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion
A.

Introduction
In addition to claiming his sentence is excessive as imposed, Johnson

also argues the district court erred in denying his I.C.R. 35 motion. (Appellant's
Brief, pp.14-15.) Specifically, Johnson claims his continued pursuit of a degree
and programming while incarcerated and the fact that he has not "received any
discipline actions" while incarcerated should have resulted in sentencing relief.
(Appellant's Brief, p.15.) Application of the correct legal standards to Johnson's
Rule 35 request shows Johnson has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of

sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the denial
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203,
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).

C.

Johnson Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion
In Denying His Rule 35 Motion
In his Rule 35 motion, Johnson noted that he continues to pursue his

degree in "Structural Fire Science" and that, while incarcerated, he has "not
recieved [sic] any discipline actions." (R., p.169.) The court denied the motion
finding Johnson failed to submit any new or additional information "that would
support a reduction of [Johnson's] sentence" and concluding the sentence "is
appropriate considering [Johnson's] criminal background and history, the
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opportunities for rehabilitation and the circumstances in this matter."
Denying Rule 35 Motion, filed May 21, 2012 (Augmentation).)

(Order

The court's

conclusion was not an abuse of discretion, particularly given the nature of the
"new" information, which was largely consistent with the self-portrait Johnson
painted at the time of sentencing where his educational pursuits and his
generally good behavior as an inmate were highlighted. (PSI, pp.17, 20, 22.)
Johnson has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
in denying his Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdict finding Johnson guilty of second-degree murder.
DATED this 19th day of March, 2013.

Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of March 2013, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SPENCERJ.HAHN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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y Attorney General
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